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This paper seeks to reconcile modern theories of economic growth and
inequality with models drawn from the Industrial Relations literature. The
paper contrasts economic notions of equity and performance with those
found in IR. The paper argues that IR has a broader conception of equity
that can potentially enrich economic models of inequality and growth as
well as models which seek to account for differences in the extent of
redistribution and social unrest across countries. The paper then goes on to
explore the common assumptions behind both approaches and suggests
appropriate policy conclusions.
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
"Our merchants and master-manufacturers complain much of the bad effects of high
wages in raising the price, and thereby lessening the sale of their goods both at home
and abroad. They say nothing of the bad effects of high profits. They are silent with
regards to the pernicious effects of their own gains. The complain only of those of other
people."
Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations [(1776) 1993,p.94]
Adam Smith  typically viewed as the forefather of free-market conservatism
 was sceptical of the alleged benefits accruing from the pure application of
efficiency (higher profits) at the expense of greater equity (higher wages). Not
only did Smith view merchants and manufacturers with deep suspicion; he
also qualified his praise of the self-equilibrating economy with a darker vision
of the dehumanising potential of a profit-orientated society. Until recently,
Smith’s views would have run counter to the approach taken by many
mainstream economists. The typical assertion regarding equity and efficiency
was that a fundamental trade-off existed between the two objectives.
According to Baumol et al. (1991: 124) "…policies designed to divide the
proverbial economic pie more equally, inadvertently cause the size of the pie
to shrink." In a similar fashion, Arthur Okun (1975: 1) once aptly remarked
that "…tradeoffs are the central study of the economist. “You can't have your
cake and eat it too” is a good candidate for the central theorem of economic
analysis."
The motivation for this paper stems from recent economic contributions
that have been more supportive of Smith’s intuitive concern over the dangers
of unbalanced divisions of national income. Research by Romer (1994),
Perotti (1994, 1996) and Benabou (1994, 1996, 2000) in particular, have
demonstrated, both theoretically and empirically, the existence of a positive
long-run association between income equality and economic performance.
1
Data for 23 OECD countries, spanning two 20 year growth periods supports
this finding. Table 1 presents OLS, random effects and fixed effects results,
  The authors would like to thank those who discussed and commented on the ideas
contained in this paper, in particular colleagues who participated in an informal workshop
held at the London School of Economics, Department of Industrial Relations, May 18,
2000. We would also like to thank those that participated in the November, 2000 pre-
conference seminar in Montreal and the official conference in Ottawa on January 27
th
2001. Both events were sponsored by the IRPP-CSLS project on the linkages between
economic growth and income inequality.
1 The emphasis on long-run relationships is important since in the short-run, there can be
trade-offs between equity and efficiency. Recent empirical literature also seems to support
this finding. For more see Lloyd-Ellis (2001).where economic growth in per capita GDP beginning in 1960 and 1970
respectively, is regressed against initial income inequality and per-capita
GDP. The negative co-efficient on initial inequality corresponds to the
modern view that equity and efficiency are complementary objectives.
2
The fact that countries with more egalitarian distributions of income
experience, on average, faster economic growth is supportive of a positive
contention long held in the field of Industrial Relations (hereafter referred to
as IR). Perhaps more than any other discipline, IR has maintained that in the
long run, equity and efficiency are complimentary goals and has sought to
integrate this idea into the mainstream of its analysis (Meltz, 1989; Barbash
1997).
3 The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to demonstrate how recent
theories linking income distribution to improved economic performance can
be infused with broader conceptions of equity, strengthened with notions of
co-operation and fairness and made more policy relevant with the help of IR
theory. Similarly, we argue that the field of IR can be enhanced by an
understanding of endogenous growth theory and the economics of
information, which demonstrate how productive opportunities are often not
capitalised upon because of credit market constraints and lack of insurance
markets for risk.
2 For more on these results and details about the data, see Foot and Gomez (2001) in
this volume.
3 According to Meltz (1989) the balancing of both objectives is a fundamental
normative proposition, one that underlies most ER analysis. Similarly, according to
Barbash (1997: 91-118) "Industrial Relations as an academic field is best
understood…as problem solving on behalf of equity in the employment relationship."
Apart from this normative stance, Industrial Relationists also generally regard "equity or
fairness…as more complimentary to efficiency in the long-run."5
Table 1 – Inequality and Economic Growth Within the OECD

































Countries 23 23 23 23
Observations 46 46 46 46
Note: The dependent variable is real per capita GDP growth between 1960-80 and
between 1970-90. The t-statistics in parentheses. R
2 is within-R
2 for fixed effects and the
overall-R
2 for random effects.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of
the growth-inequality debate and a description of key theories linking income
distribution with economic growth in both economics and IR.
4 We then
highlight two political economic models, which argue that social instability
and economic disruption are caused by higher levels of inequality and suggest
why the mechanisms involved need refining. In Section 3, we contrast
definitions of equity and efficiency in both disciplines. In Section 4, we
account for two standard empirical dilemmas currently found in the IR and
economic literatures, and show how these can be explained by drawing on
intuitions from either discipline. A major problem in IR at present, is why 
given the evidence surrounding the beneficial effects of high performance
human resource management (HRM) practises  very few companies have
adopted these HRM practices (Godard and Delaney, 2000). Similarly, we
examine the paradox of why in political economy models of inequality and
economic growth, the anticipated relations between greater pre-tax income
inequality and more redistribution do not appear in the data. We also show
why it is not necessarily the case that inequality always generates socio-
political instability, as expressed in a number of models that account for the
4 For a thorough review see Lloyd-Ellis (2001) in this volume.6
inequality growth trade-off. The last section summarises the paper and offers
policy suggestions and extensions of the research.
2. EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY: ECONOMIC AND IR
PERSPECTIVES CONTRASTED
Despite possessing differing conceptions of equity and efficiency, both IR and
much of the modern economic growth literature surveyed below is premised
on a similar underlying model of the economy. Both approaches recognise
that real world economies operate far from their Pareto optimum. In a purely
Walrasian economy the level of output and employment that prevails under
full product and factor price flexibility is optimal. In this framework, any co-
ordinated intervention on the part of actors (government, labour, or
employers) to alter existing equilibrium levels of employment or output
reduces global welfare.
However, under conditions of imperfect information, market failure, or
imperfect competition, the market prices of goods and labour generally
exceed their shadow prices. Policies that succeed in altering output are likely
to increase welfare (Romer, 1993: 13). Once Walrasian equilibrium is
abandoned, locally optimal actions cease to yield globally optimal outcomes.
Markets themselves (in the classic cases of market failure) produce some of
these circumstances while others are associated with institutions such as firms
and their internal labour markets, which supplant market relations. Even
under conditions that approximate the competitive ideal, problems of
institutional inefficiency plague virtually all of the key relationship among
economic actors in a market based economy.
5
Because the IR and endogenous growth perspectives recognise that
economies function far from the perfectly competitive ideal and because they
acknowledge the importance of looking at labour markets as more than a
series of spot market transactions, both approaches see a role for intervening
in the economy. This role occurs either at the economy or industry wide
(macro) level by equalising incomes or at the firm (micro) level by
emphasising non-monetary (i.e., intrinsic) aspects of equity in the
employment relationship. In the subsections that follow we discuss the
mechanisms, first in economics and then in IR, which link inequality to
growth. We begin by discussing the traditional view that incentives are the
key to economic performance and that these are hampered when equity takes
precedence over efficiency.
5 In Leibenstein's terminology, firms are not always able to act energetically to curb costs
and are therefore said to exhibit X-inefficiency.7
2.1 Some Background on the Inequality and Growth Debate in
Economics
The issue of incentives was (and still is) a major component of why inequality
in the distribution of income is thought to spur growth and improve
performance.
6 The question of how incentives to capital might decrease when
societies try to reduce inequality is an old one. The argument, in brief, is that
if the rich save and invest higher proportions of their incomes and if the poor
spend nearly all of theirs, then savings, investment, capital formation, and
hence, economic growth will be higher the larger the initial share of the rich.
On this precise point, Joseph Schumpeter (1950) argued, in defence of
inequality, that what often looks like excessive profits provides the bait that
lures capital in to untried fields.
7
It has also been argued that incentives to individual effort and to
entrepreneurship are compromised when distributive concerns take
precedence over performance outcomes (Mirrlees, 1971).
8 More recently,
Lazear (1998) has revived the notion of piece rates and introduced tournament
theory as a form of compensation that improves effort and performance. The
performance boost occurs not only because of the incentives brought about by
increased salary dispersion, but because of the sorting effects induced by pay
structures that separate high quality workers from the low.
Despite beliefs in the instrumental value of inequality, economists
working from an institutional perspective have never viewed existing
distributions of income as being optimal and hence the question of incentives
is secondary to the question of opportunity. Many institutional economists
have maintained that inequality is often the result not of differential ability,
but rather, the result of social exclusion, such as the unequal “caste” societies
of the Indian sub continent and racial and sexual discrimination in many other
parts of the world (Mydral, 1968). The argument is simultaneously made that
these social forms of inequality depress national aggregate output by keeping
many workers underemployed and undereducated. This has the dual effect of
impairing the willingness and ability of those at the bottom to work
6 The earliest theories such as those later popularised by Gilder (1981) and Friedman
(1979) were generally supportive of the idea that a trade-off existed between more equality
and less growth. Many of these ideas were framed (implicitly or explicitly) within the
context of a Kaldorian consumption function and then applied to a Harrod-Domar model of
growth (Fields, 1992). However, using the same theoretical framework, there were those
who argued that more equality was in fact good for growth (Leightner, 1992).
7 Schumpeter as quoted by Osberg (1984:228-231)
8 The incentive argument carries over to the macro economy when agents are assumed to
be identical and capital markets are perfect (Rebelo, 1991).8
intensively: "Greater economic equality would undoubtedly tend to greater
social equality. As social inequality is quite generally detrimental to
development, the conclusion must be that through this mechanism also,
greater equality would lead to higher productivity" (Mydral, 1968: 55).
As noted in our introduction, the question of whether income inequality
fosters or hinders economic growth is one that was abandoned for some time,
and has recently received renewed attention. For a variety of reasons, until the
early nineties, not much theoretical or empirical work had been undertaken
which linked distribution with macro-economic performance. Economists
were in general agreement that the more relevant problem was the means by
which economic growth and development affected income distribution and
not vice versa. Most of this century's research on the subject was spawned by
Simon Kuznets seminal work in the area. Kuznets (1955) theorised that as
development progressed, structural changes associated with economic growth
 chiefly industrialisation, increased urbanisation and schooling – would
produce an initial increase in inequality. However, as societies advanced even
further, they would eventually surpass a “threshold level”, whereby income
distribution would become more rather than less egalitarian.
 Given that the
Kuznets hypothesis seemed to account for the experience of many countries
(OECD, 1993: 61-62) a natural question arises: What caused the breakdown
in the growth and inequality consensus?
The answer to such a question can be found by examining two separate
developments; one theoretical and the other empirical. From a theoretical
perspective, the late 1980s witnessed a revival of growth theory. The revival
was partly induced by the fact that since the early seventies, growth rates in
many industrialised countries had fallen from their post-war highs. Casual
empiricism also demonstrated that countries at similar levels of development
were growing at different rates. Exploring the effects of alternative variables –
apart from the level of development and human capital –on national growth
rates was one way that macro-economists could begin to “rescue” the neo-
classical growth model from its absolute convergence implications.
9 One of
the variables that varied across countries was income inequality and so
economists began to construct models where differing initial distributions of
income affected future national growth paths (Galor and Zeira, 1993).
From an empirical perspective, the equity-efficiency “trade-off” was
questioned much earlier. In a cross-sectional study of sixty-six countries,
9 The absolute convergence hypothesis stems form the Solow growth model, where all
countries were expected to converge to a steady state level of per-capita economic
growth.9
Ahluwalia (1976) concluded that "the rate of growth of GDP in [his] sample
was positively related to the share of income received by the lowest 40%,
suggesting that the objectives of growth and equity [were] not in conflict".
Other researchers found no statistically significant relationship between
inequality in the initial distribution of income and the subsequent rate of
growth of GDP (Fields, 1991 and Osberg, 1984). And since the early 1990s, a
number of empirical cross-sectional studies have established that countries
with more egalitarian distributions of income tend to exhibit faster economic
growth (Aghion et al., 1999).
 10
2.2 Modern Economic Approaches Linking Inequality to Lower Growth
Imperfect Capital Markets and Human Capital Spillovers
In one of the earliest and most often cited papers, Galor and Zeira (1993)
provide a model where investment in human capital positively affects long
run economic growth. In their model, borrowing is difficult and/or
impossible, therefore those who inherit a large initial endowment of wealth
are better able to invest in human capital.
 11 If the number of these people is
relatively small, then an unequal distribution of income adversely affects the
“aggregate” amount of investment in human capital and hence dampens
output. The model also implies "that rich families remain rich and poor
families remain poor." This is a function of imperfect capital market
structures. Other researchers working within the financial imperfection
paradigm have demonstrated in more explicit terms how inequality can persist
across generations and how this same inequality subsequently affects
economic growth.
Benabou (1996) demonstrates how small differences in educational
technologies, preferences, or initial endowments of wealth, when combined
with imperfect borrowing markets, leads to a high degree of social and
geographical stratification. Stratification makes inequality in education and
income more persistent across generations and this social polarisation leads to
the formation of ghettos and large pockets of poverty. These areas can be very
inefficient, both from Pareto criteria and in terms of long run aggregate
growth. This can be seen by noting that in addition to local interactions in
10 Recently, work by Forbes (2000) has cast doubt on these findings. But these results are
not necessarily incompatible with the view that in the long run, equity and efficiency are
still complimentary. For more on this point see Lloyd-Ellis (2001) in this volume
11 Temple (1999) notes the problem that in empirical work, human capital is measured only
with formal education and not training.10
education, the wealthy and the less well off interact together at a number of
levels in the production of goods and the delivery of services such as:
  technological spillovers (some may be computer engineers while others
service or repair the technology);
  complimentarities in the labour market (some are highly trained
managers while others are low skill workers); or
  community externalities (some are owners of expensive housing while
others live adjacently in low income and unhealthy accommodation).
12
 
The implications of Benabou’s model are rather intuitive. Depending on the
level of economy wide human capital, marginal products may be lower for
individuals living in areas with a high degree of inequality, even if personal
human capital levels are the same or even greater than those living in areas
with low inequality. In evaluating this model of growth, Romer's (1994)
observation that worker's with high levels of human capital migrate not to
places where it is scarce, but to places where it is abundant, is a powerful a
piece of illustrative evidence (perhaps as strong as any number of cross-
country growth regressions).
In the class of models described above, complimentarities in the labour
market (e.g., the combination of well educated senior employees or managers
coupled with workers with low levels of training) may not be very efficient.
In a dynamic setting, the presence of imperfections in capital markets can
prevent successive generations from improving their human capital
requirements or from acquiring necessary skills and this could lead to the
formation of ghettos and poverty traps. Eventually, productivity growth
should slow and in turn depress aggregate economic output (Benabou, 1994:
824-825). Observations drawn from the IR literature point to a similar
conclusion; organisations do well when employers invest in the multi-skilling
of employees and well educated senior employees encourage input from
subordinates on improving the quality and efficiency of the production
process (e.g., increasing employee participation). 
13
12 There is epidemiological evidence which demonstrates that even high income groups are
affected by greater levels of inequality through higher incidence of disease. The spread of
these diseases occurs either directly through dilapidated housing stock or indirectly as
inequitable income distributions have consequences on people's perception of their social
environment that influence their health. For a more detailed review of the health research
see Lynch and Kaplan (1998).
13 Betcherman et. al. (1994, p. 68) found a “… positive and statistically significant impact
of the participation-based approach on three of the four labour performance measures …”.11
POLITICAL ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO INEQUALITY AND
GROWTH
Two major political economic models have been advanced in order to explain
the observed negative relation between inequality and growth; they are fiscal
policy models based on public choice theory and models of political
instability. Their mechanisms are similar and are sketched out in figure 1
below.
Figure 1: Political Economic Channels Linking Inequality to Lower Growth
The fiscal policy theories have been simultaneously advanced by Persson &
Tabellini (1992, 1994) and Alesina & Rodrik (1992, 1994). Both are quite
similar and follow the logic of public choice theory, in that they both assume
that voter preferences presumably influence government policies. When
income inequality is quite high, large segments of the population are more
willing to tax growth promoting activities, such as investments in physical
and human capital. Policies that maximise growth are optimal only for a
government that cares solely about the “capitalist” class. In both versions, the
higher the inequality of wealth and income, the higher the rate of taxation and
consequently the lower the growth rate. Countries that have large initial





















redistribute and it is the effect of “distortionary” taxation and redistribution
that ultimately lowers growth.
This theory, however, is not supported by available cross-country data,
which demonstrates that higher income inequality before redistribution is
associated with lower degrees of state transfers. This stylised fact fits with the
archetypal idea we have of the United States and Europe, and is also borne
out by a comparison of Gini ratios to tax revenue as a percentage of GDP
among the 29 member states of the OECD (see Figure 3). The slope of the
regression line and correlation is negative (-0.68), indicating that countries
with more pre-tax inequality have lower tax to GDP ratios. Canada, as
always, lies in the middle with Mexico and Sweden occupying opposite ends
of the spectrum. Empirically, income inequality before and after redistribution
is also highly correlated and countries with more egalitarian pre-tax
distributions of income tend to support higher levels of transfers and higher
growth rates (Benabou, 1996).
The evidence concerning the effects of progressive taxation also seem
to run in an opposite direction to that predicted by fiscal policy models, with
many countries seemingly stuck in low taxation/high inequality traps. Thus,
higher optimal taxes  by moving people out of poverty and into education
and productive sectors of the economy  would increase growth rather than
dampen it. A natural experiment of sorts can be found in the U.S where under
the Clinton administration the top income tax rate was raised to 36 percent
from 31 percent in 1993. Republicans labelled it the biggest tax increase in
the history of the world and predicted that the economy would fall into
recession. Instead, the pace of economic growth increased and sustained itself
for the following seven years of Clinton’s presidency.
Alesina and Perotti (1993) have advanced a more direct politico-
economic model where the link between inequality and growth does not
depend on fiscal policy, but rather, inequality fuels social and political
discontent. Discontent (which can take on varied forms from riots and coups,
strikes, industrial conflict, and increased crime rates) creates socio-political
instability and this reduces investment. 
14 The evidence is more strongly in
favour of the instability model than the high tax fiscal policy channel, but
14 The recent strike of engineers at Boeing in Seattle is an excellent example of the
impact of industrial discontent on output. A major factor underlying the demand for
substantial salary increases was not dissatisfaction with “own pay” but was said to be
the large increases in executive salaries at Boeing.13
there are still problems.
15 In section 4 we provide an explanation for the
failure of median voter predictions as a function of three concepts borrowed
from the IR perspective.
2.3  IR Approaches Linking Equity and Growth
In this section we highlight two areas where IR provides potential links
between equity and efficiency, but which are absent in the current literature
on economic growth and inequality. The first is the high performance
paradigm which argues that “good” employers are also profitable ones.
Second we explore the effects of equity on co-operative behaviour.
The High Performance Workplace and Human Resource Model
Since the mid 1980s the field of IR, especially in North America, has
undergone a transformation. As noted by Godard and Delaney (2000) the new
paradigm’s initial thesis was formalised by Kochan Katz and McKersie
(1986) who argued quite persuasively that competitive pressures beginning in
the early eighties elicited a change in the shared assumptions of the IR system
among employees, the state and chiefly among employers. This resulted in a
15 Perotti (1994) has tested the various mechanisms underlying the effects of income
distribution on investment and growth and has concluded that "the results [of his
regressions] seem to cast doubts on the empirical validity of the endogenous fiscal
policy
explanation of the relation between income distribution and investment, while the
imperfect capital market approach and especially the political instability explanation
receive more convincing support from the data".
Mexico
Figure 2: Pre-Tax Inequality and Tax Revenue, 1998 (29 OECD Countries)
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breakdown in traditional forms of collective bargaining and a decline in union
power and forced firms to adopt new polices to manage labour. Some of these
policies were of the low road variety (slashing labour costs, decertifying
unions, more contingent work) but many of them were also of the high road
variant including flexible work arrangements, performance based pay,
employee participation, team work, and job security. This latter model has
been termed the high performance human resource workplace model. The
high performance model has spawned two research streams. The first
examines the effect of high performance HRM practices on firm level
performance and has generally concluded that high performance polices (if
implemented jointly and not piecemeal) are beneficial to firm profitability
(Ichnowski et al. 1996). Put simply, as the recent title of a new book
surveying the literature has stated, companies seem to do well by doing good
(Baker, 1999).
The second approach has tried to explain why these practices have not
diffused across firms. Although there is some debate, many IR scholars buy
into the high performance paradigm and therefore ascribe the lack of diffusion
to a combination of strategic failures and cultural obstacles rather than a
deficiency in the HRM model itself.
16 Much like “the famous one hundred
bill” on the sidewalk, high performance practices (if they produce such
tangible benefits) should have been “picked up” by now. The explanations on
offer by the IR literature are not convincing nor rigours. In section 4 we take
the “market imperfection” approach found in the economics of information
and adapt it to the firm level in an attempt to explain why these innovations
have failed to spread across the economy.
Equity and Co-operation
Another area where IR theory can potentially add value to economic theories
of equity and growth centres on the role of co-operation and performance.
Economists recognise that obtaining globally optimal outcomes in the face of
imperfectly competitive or incomplete markets requires co-operative
behaviour among economic agents so as to limit rent seeking behaviour
(Olson, 1982, 2000). What is less often mentioned is that non-market
institutions  such as unions, works councils, HR departments and labour
relations boards (typically viewed as a “constraints” in the Walrasian
framework)  can act in ways that generate ongoing relationships between
employers and employees. Once in place, these relationships place limits on
the extent of pecuniary gains that one party can extract over the other.
16 Godard and Delaney (2000) have recently critiqued this view.15
Ongoing relationships also produce repeated interactions among actors,
which are conducive to the sharing of information and the development of
trust. Trust in the employment relationship is not exogenously determined and
needs to be supported by considerations of distributive justice. In cross-
country comparisons of IR systems it has been found that successful team
based and “lean production” systems, require employees who are highly
committed to improving the production process. This commitment is
forthcoming, in part, because of job security but also because employees
recognise that the financial results of productivity improvements will be
equitably shared (Adams, 1995). Indeed, if economic success ultimately
depends not only on individual productivity but on team based interactions
and co-operation, as Benabou's (1994, 1996) growth model suggests, then
considerations of equity imply that a strategy of low wages and large wage
differentials is sorely deficient.
17
Examples drawn from the field of IR serve as particularly illustrative
case studies. One of the most famous labour cost-cutters was Frank Lorenzo
whose small Texas Air Company expanded through take-overs and cutting
wages. His initial success came apart when he tried the same tactics on
Eastern Airlines. The battle ended in a lose-lose result with the airline torn
apart and Lorenzo filing for bankruptcy. The end result was the same for
Peoples Airline, which started up as an employee partnership when the “open
skies” policy permitted new competitors to enter the passenger field. Peoples
was used in university business school cases as an example of how small
companies could survive and prosper in the new competitive environment.
That is, until the company went bankrupt. The lesson seems to be that
competing on the basis of relatively low wages is not sufficient, by itself, for
long-term prosperity in industrialised economies.
The most innovative sectors of the economy do not manage to develop
flexible work practices by forcing wages lower or by exchanging major parts
of their labour force with the external labour market. Rather, they generally
rely on reassigning workers internally. Where external labour markets are
utilised, costs associated with search, negotiation, and monitoring are
typically higher. Moreover, in the external labour market, because neither
employers nor employees have any certainty that the employment relationship
will persist, each is encouraged to act with very short time horizons. Betrayal
17 Roach (1996) makes this point in relation to how US business leaders during the early
and mid nineties managed to gain profitability improvements through the unsustainable
low road approach of cost cutting. Nevertheless there may be micro-economic settings
where these kind of wage differentials can work to motivate employees (see Lazear, 1998).16
early on, in the form of layoff on the part of an employer (say because of a
downturn in the economy) or turnover on the part of an employee (say at the
first opportunity for a better job prospect) negates potential benefits accrued
over the course of the entire relationship.
It is for the purpose of overcoming these and other inefficiencies that
employer/employee relationships have traditionally been organised within
firms (Cappelli, 1995). Employee acceptance of structural changes, multi-
skilling and acquiring additional skills increases not only with job security but
with remuneration that is felt to be equitable. Ultimately, wage structures that
are felt to be inequitable manifest themselves in a lack of motivation and an
unwillingness to adapt and co-operate with management (Akerloff and
Yellen, 1986).
Gordon (1996), in a summary of studies of co-operation at both the
micro and macro-wide level, suggests that token gestures in the co-operative
direction are not sufficient conditions to improve commitment and hence
performance from workers. Rather, observations drawn from studies of labour
market economics and employment relations point to at least three conditions
necessary for successful co-operation: a real and perceived equitable sharing
of productivity gains with workers; significant employment security (so that
workers do not worry that production innovations will result in layoffs); and
substantial institutional changes to build up employee voice and group
involvement and not just individual participation (since much of a worker's
contribution to production depends on group effort and co-ordination).
What is interesting to note from the list above is that despite being a
macro-economist, Gordon’s list is heavily informed from the field of IR
where equity involves more than just the remunerative dimension. In this
sense, we see how IR differs from the economic approach in that non-
pecuniary or intrinsic outcomes are an essential input to the observed
inequality efficiency trade-off. These differences in approach between
economics and IR are discussed in more detail below.
3. EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY: INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS VS.
ECONOMICS
3.1   Conceptions of Equity Contrasted
An important part of the distinction between economic notions of equity and
those found in industrial relations is that economists confine equity to17
monetary equality.
18 For economists, equality typically refers to equality in
the distribution of income, which has two meanings. In one sense, it refers to
the distribution of national income or gross domestic product (GDP) among
factors of production (e.g. labour and capital). Alternatively, income
distribution can refer to the distribution of income within labour's share or
among individual income earners.
19 Recent literature has tended to emphasise
the latter definition.
20
For industrial relationists, the important point is the notion of fair
compensation, which does not necessarily require income equality, but rather,
it requires looking at compensation as only one component of equity in the
employment relationship (Barbash, 1987). The five other aspects of equity are
the extent to which there is: (1) secure employment; (2) the right to a say at
work; (3) due process in the handling of complaints; (4) fair treatment at
work; and (5) meaningful work. This means that there can be tradeoffs among
the five intrinsic components of equity and extrinsic rewards such as wages
and bonuses. While economists have introduced the concept of efficiency
wages and have even gone so far as to model the employment relationship as
partial gift exchange (Akerlof, 1982) industrial relationists examine the
impact of all aspects of equity on employee welfare and on the productivity of
the workplace. Even in the absence of a change in the wage structure,
18 The concept of inequality also has a wealth and income dimension (Aghion et al., 1999).
The former is relevant when examining the effects of distribution on aggregate output
through its effects on individual investments in physical and human capital, whereas the
latter dimension is relevant when examining the feedback effects of economic growth on
distribution. In this paper we assume that income inequality and wealth inequality are
interchangeable. This is not too problematic an assumption given the high correlation
between both measures in cross-sections but the two concepts offer competing channels
linking distribution and growth.
19 Two measures are often used to capture this definition. Quintile shares – or the
proportion of wage and non-wage income accruing to five distinct groups ranging from the
poorest 20% of the population to the richest 20% - are often used. In a perfectly equitable
society every quintile would receive 20% of total income. A second proxy, the Gini
coefficient uses a Lorenz curse to measure income inequality. The higher the Gini
coefficient the lower the level of income equality.
20 However, the distribution of income among factors of production is an important
concept and one that cannot be ignored Indeed, it is with regards to this former definition
that a trade-off between equity and efficiency is likely to exist. If too little national income
goes to capital in the form of profits, investment may suffer and thereby dampen future
consumption for workers.18
considerations of the non-wage dimensions of equity can contribute to both
improved productivity and employee attachment to an employer. 
21
Why is Fairness so Important to Industrial Relationists?
Economists sometimes find it difficult to understand the importance of
fairness. The following quote by Milton Friedman (1979: 127) is illustrative
of this tendency:
"Much of the moral fervour behind the drive for equality of outcome comes from
the widespread belief that it is not fair that some….should have a great advantage
over others simply because they happen to have wealthy parents. Of course it is
not fair…[but what does fairness have to do with it?]"
The problem resides in ascribing to fairness only its normative meaning.
Apart from it being something “good” in a moral sense, fairness is
instrumentally important because its absence is a primary source of
distributive tension. For Industrial Relationists, fairness is important because
it is only the perceived fairness of the rules of the game that ensures voluntary
acceptance of those rules. This occurs at every level of the employment
relationship and also extends beyond the confines of the organisation to an
economy as a whole. If a citizen is born without a large initial endowment of
wealth and he perceives that the system is unfair and that there is no serious
effort on the part of either government, management or labour, to reform
those rules, then why should he follow or respect the rules in the first place?
The role of fairness expectations in wealth distribution also has some
interesting historical antecedents.
22 In an agricultural society land is the
primary source of wealth. In the Bible, among the 12 tribes of Israel, every
family, no matter how difficult the situation, had the expectation that their
land would be restored to them, “… it shall be a jubilee unto you; and ye shall
return every man unto his possession…” (Leviticus 25, 10). Dr. J. H. Hertz
observes that “In this way the original equal division of the land was restored.
The permanent accumulation of land in the hands of a few was prevented, and
21 This was the finding of Betcherman et. al. (1994) in their survey of human resource
practices in Canada. Such non-wage initiatives as progressive decision-making (employee
involvement) and social responsibility (involvement in issues of concern to society)
produced a statistically significant improvement in the economic performance of the firms
they surveyed, whereas incentive-pay programs had no impact.
22 The Bible mandates that, after the land of Israel was divided among the 12 tribes, in
every Jubilee (fiftieth) year land was be restored to the families within their tribes
(Leviticus, 25, verses 8-55). Even if a person was forced by economic circumstances to sell
his land and become a servant, the sale was only until the next Jubilee, no more than 50
years, since an inheritance of land could not be permanently alienated from a family.19
those whom fault or misfortune had thrown into poverty were given a “second
chance” (Hertz 1978: 533). Interestingly, from an IR perspective and in
keeping with the tenets of equity-efficiency theory, there is no record of a
slave revolt in ancient Israel.
Turning to the economic growth models presented in Section 2,
productivity was seen to depend not only on individual performance but also
on the interaction of individuals working within firms and interacting within
communities or regions. In such instances, considerations of fairness pointed
against excessive income differentials. In a similar fashion, Section 2
presented a political instability model of economic growth. In that model,
mention was made of the disruptive socio-political effects that income
inequality could exert. Increased instability, in the form of excessive work
stoppages and general labour unrest, was highlighted as one potential channel
by which income inequality can dampen investment and hence economic
growth.
As appealing as such a model may be it ignored the fact that unequal
distributions of income are able to coexist with little labour unrest so long as
workers perceive that their social mobility is not compromised. Moreover,
beliefs about social mobility are intimately linked to the perceived fairness of
the system of employment relations. How, then, can systems maintain this
sense of fairness in the face of wide disparities of wealth and income?
Clearly, one avenue is the provision of education and training and the
associated social mobility implied in such provision. To the extent that
education is removed from the market and provided equally to all workers
(either by firms or government) cycles of poverty are reduced and social
mobility is enhanced. However, to the extent that education and training is
allocated via the market and its “consumption” depends on the financial
resources of individuals, then the distribution of income and perceptions of
fairness take on a great deal of importance.
3.1   Conceptions of Efficiency Contrasted
A less striking but still significant contrast emerges when we compare
economic and IR notions of efficiency or performance. Efficiency in the
economic models of growth seen earlier, is usually defined as the rate of GDP
growth per capita and often measured over a five to twenty-five year period.
However, this is a somewhat myopic view of performance, since a proper
measure should look beyond first moments (averages) and also include the
variance of output, or the volatility of economic performance over time.
Would a country be willing to tolerate higher average per capita growth if it
entailed greater volatility in output? Put simply, would Canadians prefer a20
recession every five years even if it meant a slight increase in our rate of
growth over a twenty year period? As noted by Stiglitz (1998) these are
questions often pushed aside by economists, but limiting risk (e.g., the
business cycle; industrial restructuring) is an important measure of national
performance that takes on more weight once we acknowledge the presence of
imperfect capital markets, imperfect information and hysterisis in labour
markets (e.g., the persistence of involuntary unemployment).
The IR concept of efficiency is broader in this respect, as it
incorporates what is of value to labour as well as management. Therefore, in
order to understand why equity is a necessary condition of a workable
industrial society, one has to first make a distinction between what Barbash
(1989) terms allocative and real efficiency.
The Distinction Between Allocative and Real Efficiency
Allocative efficiency encompasses the technical procedures needed to
maximise output given certain constraints. Although necessary, in the context
of labour markets (whether internal or external) allocative efficiency gives
rise to a distributive tension between worker wages and enterprise profits. The
rationalisation of the workforce along formally efficient criteria can create
problems of alienation, shirking, and low morale. Therefore, in order to
enhance real efficiency, allocative efficiency needs to be mediated by equity.
Equity considerations (broadly defined as Barbash’s five intrinsic components
of fair compensation) impede the dictates of allocative efficiency because
labour is not a homogeneous input, nor is it simply a factor of production that
can be maximised in the same way as capital. Capital requires no moral or
psychological inducements to put its potential to full use (e.g., you do not
have to compliment your computer on how dependable it is in order for it to
print out your documents every morning); labour, on the other hand, does.
Workers are therefore distinct from other organisational inputs because of
their intrinsically human requirements for fairness, voice, and job security as
preconditions before making maximal contributions to real efficiency. In this
regard, the equity-efficiency principle implicitly recognises that the sole
pursuit of allocative efficiency within organisations can create counter forces
that in the end dampen actual output. If one applies the logic of allocative
efficiency to the question of how to set pay within a firm, for example, one is
led to the conclusion that wage flexibility is the logical pay scheme to adopt.
Flexible pay schemes dictate that workers should be paid differentially
depending on how productive they are. This flexibility should be applied
across individuals (clearly not everyone doing the same job is as productive)
and for a single individual over time (clearly, on any given day, the same21
individual can be more or less productive). The idea is simple: to ensure
allocative efficiency low productivity should be remunerated with low wages
and vice versa.
Two problems, however, characterise the flexible conception of worker
remuneration. First, Barbash’s notion of real efficiency recognises that the
productivity of an individual worker is hard to measure within organisations,
as personal output is often dependent (both directly and indirectly) on the
work of others. The obvious examples are quality circles and work teams
where the interdependence of production is readily apparent. But, difficulties
in apportioning an individual’s contribution to the success of an organisation
occur even within traditional “Tayloristic” assembly line and processing
operations   where one would expect that individual output is easily
identifiable and hence lessening the need for more equitable compensation
schemes. Even if output was directly observable (as in piece rate systems)
employees can still conceal inherent levels of ability and maximal effort. This
is so because the setting of piece rates requires some benchmark estimate of
the average time or output for a given task, and workers can therefore collude
to keep those initial benchmarks low.
23
In practice, even after Tayloristic de-skilling, workers manage to hoard
information that “scientific” management lacks (Kusterer, 1978).
24 Any form
of non-automated production or service delivery (i.e., work which involves
labour and not solely capital) is always social and is therefore never just a
technical process. The nature of worker involvement in that process is
necessarily a critical ingredient in the realization of real efficiencies for
organizations. 
25 The idea that employees hold a great deal of knowledge that
their employers do not have and would otherwise like to get is not new. For
over a century, most theorists of work and management have embarked from
just this starting point. One of the most famous passages in this regard can be
found in Marx with his discussion of the difference between the bee and the
architect. According to Marx (1976: 284):
23 An illustrative case of just such a phenomenon, is provided by Roy (1952). While there
are clear cases of where piece rate systems do work (Lazear, 1998), Roy’s article is a
classic study of a piece rate incentive system which is possibly the worst designed and
most ineffective system ever documented.
24 As noted by Jackson (1993: 10) “…production ultimately depends upon the ability and
willingness of workers to solve problems and to maintain a smooth flow of production or
operations.”
25 Even under conditions that approximate the competitive ideal, problems of institutional
inefficiency plague virtually all of the key relationships among economic actors in market
based economy. As Harvey Leibenstein has emphasised, an organisation’s costs depend
not just on its technology, but also on the vigour with which it pursues efficiency.22
A spider conducts operations, which resemble those of the weaver, and a bee
would put many a human architect to shame by the construction of its honeycomb
cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that the
architect builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax. At the end of
every labour process, a result emerges which had already been conceived by the
worker at the beginning, hence already existed ideally.
The notion alluded to by Marx in the above passage is quite intuitive: unlike
other factors of production, labour is unique in that it houses a productive
potential which for firms is intrinsically hard (and ex ante perhaps impossible)
to fully measure. The motivation underlying the bee and architect analogy is
akin to modern interpretations based on asymmetric information. The idea is
that employers can purchase the labour time of their employees but not
necessarily their effort. In order to maximise labour potential, inducements
(both intrinsic and extrinsic) need to be offered by the firm.
Finally, real efficiency explicitly recognises that even if it were
possible to disentangle individual effort and productivity, firms still would
have to supervise workers more closely in order to measure individual output.
Increased supervision, in turn, imposes direct costs for the firm (i.e. paying
for more supervisors and surveillance cameras). The decision to supervise
more closely may also cause morale problems, breed resentment, increase
turnover and ultimately may lower firm level performance by limiting the
ability for workers to form productive social relations that facilitate co-
operation.
4. A SYNTHESIS OF THE ER AND ENDOGENOUS GROWTH
PERSPECTIVES
Earlier we noted the twin failures of median voter predictions to account for
the case of countries that sustain high pre-tax inequality and low levels of
redistribution and the failure of high performance workplace practices to
diffuse. Below we offer explanations for these anomalies drawn from the IR
and economic fields respectively.
4.1 Why Don’t We Observe Greater Redistribution in Societies that
are Unequal?
In this section, we provide an explanation for the failure of median voter
predictions as a function of three concepts borrowed from the IR perspective:
(1) the presence of procedural justice, (2) the presence of institutional holes
that fail to translate public desires into actions, and finally (3) perceptual23
differences that systematically over estimate the probability of social mobility
and thus reduce the impetus for redistribution.
What does standard economic theory have to say about the effects of
excessive pre-transfer income inequality on worker attitudes? The
conventional explanation put forward is that in countries or regions with
greater pre-transfer inequality, the income of the median (decisive) voter
relative to the national average is lowered. This pre-transfer inequality sets in
motion pressure, via the political franchise, to redistribute income either
directly through the tax structure or by increasing shares of government
expenditures as a percentage of GDP. As we demonstrated earlier, contrary to
the predictions of the median voter theorem, countries with higher
government transfers as a percentage of GDP are associated with lower pre-
transfer inequality. It is this fact – one which runs contrary to standard public
choice theory – which has generated a number divergent explanations.
The explanation we offer is represented in Figure 3. The logic is the
following: actual increases in redistributive polices result only if the following
conditions are met: (1) socio-economic mobility has to be low; (2) it has to be
perceived as being low by agents; (3) there has to be a desire to change the
mobility patterns; (4) and supportive institutions (e.g., political parties, or
unions with power at either a national level or strong at a workplace level)
have to exist, in order to translate latent desires for more redistribution into
actual outcomes. In the absence of supportive institutions such as labour
unions or viable political parties, the discontent brought about by high
inequality and lower mobility is channelled into social unrest which may or
may not lead to a response by authorities to redistribute. It could very well
spawn a harsher crackdown and more suppression, which is why the channel
connecting social unrest to increased redistribution leaves open two routes
and recognizes the uncertainty of this channel and its anticipated effect on
redistribution.24
Figure 3: IR Channels Linking Inequality to Social Unrest and Redistribution
Social Mobility Patterns: Why Do Perceptions Matter?
In terms of mobility rates, economists have recently begun to model their
effect on political outcomes. In one of the earliest papers, Piketty (1995)
provides a model where individuals, in otherwise identical jurisdictions, differ
only in their perception of whether the economic system is fair. The fairness
of the economic system is quite an open ended concept. Perceptions of
fairness in his model are linked to the ability of lower income individuals to
move up the distributional ladder. The idea that this kind of social mobility
plays a pivotal role in determining political preferences (especially towards
income inequality and redistribution) has a long history in the social
sciences.
26 However, comparative empirical studies demonstrate that among
countries with similar levels of economic development, actual social mobility
rates are essentially the same; yet perceptions of social mobility differ
markedly (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992).
26 According to Piketty (1995: 552-553), "De Tocqueville first stressed the idea that
differences in attitudes toward redistribution between Europe and the United States could




















In this regard, Lipset (1992) has suggested that long lasting differences
among European and North American attitudes regarding redistributive
politics may be the result of persistent differences in popular beliefs about
social mobility, and not actual mobility rates. According to Lipset (1992:xx-
xxi) "What explains the contrast in the political values and allegiances of
American workers with those of other democratic nations?….the belief
system concerning class rigidities stemming from varying historical
experience…seems much more important than slight variations in rates of
mobility." Lipset's remark coincides with Benabou's (1996) observation that
"….citizens of otherwise identical countries may end up with different
distributions of beliefs concerning social mobility, which translate into
different perceived tradeoffs between the insurance and incentive effects of
redistribution."
How, then, do perceptions such as these affect real outcomes?
According to one variant of this general approach, the closer workers perceive
their wages as being tied to productivity the less likely they are to feel that
existing distributions of income are unfair and hence inequitable (Rottemberg,
1996). In such a case, workers feeling that they can do little to remove wages
out of competition, tolerate greater inequality, forgo demands for greater
union representation or higher remuneration from employers and instead
demand lower taxes from governments. Given the growth of performance
related pay, the simultaneous fall in union density, higher inequality and the
popularity of political parties whose aim is to lower taxes, suggests that this
mechanism may be at work in a number of countries. Ultimately, perceptions
such as these have the potential to be self reinforcing and can therefore serve
to maintain higher levels of pre and post transfer inequality. One way of
demonstrating the empirical validity of the model would be to show that
holding all else constant, actual pre-transfer inequality is higher the greater
the perception among workers that income inequality is not excessive.
In this regard, Lipset and Meltz (1996) present cross-sectional evidence
comparing American and Canadian regional opinions about the excessive
nature of income differentials. Combining individual responses from states
and provinces to the question “Do you believe that the gap between the rich
and the poor is too wide?”, a cross-sectional sample of 14 state regions and
provinces was generated and used to test this hypothesis.
27 Examining table 2
27 Of course, one has to be careful regarding causality in these cross sectional models
since we cannot know for how long people have held these perceptions. Furthermore,
most economic analysis is silent on the sources of opinions. Opinions and tastes are
taken as given and nothing us usually said on how perceptions or tastes may change
over time.26
reveals that regions where perceptions of income inequality are lowest (in
Ontario and B.C. for example) are also associated with higher levels of actual
pre-transfer inequality. The correlation between these figures is -.35. It should
be noted that these are also states and regions with lower union density.
Table 2: Perceived vs. Actual Inequality in the United States and Canada
Province/State


















*Note: Perceived Inequality is measured using the percentage of respondents who “agreed
strongly” with the following statement: “The gap between rich and poor
(Canadians/Americans) is too wide.” Source: Lipset and Meltz (1996) Angus Reid Survey.
Gini ratio for Canada in 1995 is taken from Perspectives on Labour and Income, Winter
1998; for U.S. it is taken from Canadian Economic Observer, August 2000.
4. 2 Why Don’t High Performance Human Resource Practices Diffuse?
Here we show how the diffusion of high performance workplace practices can
be hampered by a combination of start up-costs, imperfect capital markets and
a lack of insurance to absorb the risk arising from the adoption of innovative
work arrangements. We also show how the adoption of high road practices is
not uniform and despite the long run benefits, societies if they are not able to27
remove credit constraints and shield individuals and institutions from the risks
that they may incur, will fail to adopt the high road.
First we begin by combining fairness theory with the models of
economic growth and income distribution discussed earlier in section 2.
Consider the following stylised model of an economy populated by many
firms and workers. Initially each firm and worker has a different level of
accumulated capital or wealth and each has access to two different productive
opportunities or projects, H or L. One of the projects is more attractive than
the other. In particular the output of the first project grows faster than that of
the second, E(H)  >  E(L). Undertaking the more productive high growth
project requires an up front set up cost, H >0 while the less productive one
entails no such cost L=0. For firms, the choice in projects is analogous to
the low-road (low cost) vs. high-road (high-commitment) analogy (Verma,
1995). In the low-road option, firms focus on cost reductions via downsizing
and wage rollbacks in an attempt to gain a cost advantage over their
competitors. The high road option is more costly, initially, because firms
either invest in workers and in innovation to create new products and services
or they try to achieve higher quality from existing products or services. In this
way, firms gain temporary monopoly power and they increase their sales
either at the expense of their competitors or by expanding the market. For
individuals the opportunity sets are similar. The low road for workers entails a
path of little education and training; hence low initial costs. Ultimately,
however, this choice results in low paying and less productive employment.
The high road, or the more costly option, forgoes present income streams in
favour of advanced education and training and may therefore entail negative
early returns. This model is graphically illustrated in figure 4.
Figure 4: The Choice Between High Road versus Low Road Human Resource
Practices*
E (H) = 10  E (H) = 20
H > 0
High Road
Low Road L = 0 E (L) = 8   
E(L) = 8
*If the short term time horizon dominates, managers only undertake the High Road project
if in period t1 the expected payoff is higher E(H) - H > E(L). If Start up costs are too high







up costs are zero in the first period. Only in the long run is the pay off to the high road
project sufficiently large to outweigh initial start-up cost.
In the absence of any initial set up costs, every (profit maximising) firm
would choose the high growth project and every (utility maximising) worker
would undertake the more productive opportunity. The same would be true if
borrowing and lending markets were perfectly competitive. In such a case, an
initially poor worker or cash strapped firm would be able to obtain a loan to
pay for the set up costs of the high-road option. Suppose, however, that
workers and firms cannot borrow. Under these conditions, initial levels of
accumulated capital or retained earnings (in the case of a firm) and wealth (in
the case of an individual) limit the project that any given firm or worker
undertakes. Certain firms and individuals may be unable to pay the up front
costs associated with the high-road option and this situation may persist if
workers become locked into low wage jobs or firms focus on strategies of
cost minimisation and high profit margins.
Empirically, we know that there is a consistent payoff from education
for individuals. For the United States, and most countries, the rates of
joblessness are inversely related to the level of educational achievement
(Pryor ad Schaffer 1999, pp. 9 and 134).
28 But higher education is
increasingly becoming less affordable and reliant more on private financing
across many industrialised economies (OECD, 1998). Similarly, organisations
that undertake a high commitment approach, as Betcherman, et. al. (1994 p.
96) observe, incur “… higher costs in the short run – placing greater emphasis
on attaching a priority to human resource initiatives requires investment”.
These same authors delineate other costs as well, such as sharing information
and decision-making with employees.
29
The initial distribution of income and the extent of competition among
firms, therefore, become crucial for determining an economy's adoption of
high road practices, and hence its overall growth rate. If a disproportionate
amount of income accrues to only the top quintile of individuals, then only a
few undertake the high-growth opportunity, while most other workers will be
28 A major exception is Israel where until 1997, the least educated had lower levels of
unemployment than those with a high school education (Weisberg and Meltz, 1999).
29 But the benefits are: efficiency gains, lower turnover, better employee-employer
relations, and potential for a better bottom line. The combination, known as high
performance human resource practices, which include investment in training, were also
found by MacDuffie and Krafcik (1992) and Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1993) to
have a consistently favourable impact on productivity.29
stuck in relatively unproductive endeavours, making the average growth rate
of the economy lower than it would otherwise be. Similarly, if only a few
firms have access to loanable funds, many firms may be forced into the low
road option. Equitable distributions of income and competitive capital market
structures enable more workers and firms to undertake the high-growth
project, increasing overall growth.
This illustrative explanation is consistent with both the tenets of equity-
efficiency theory in IR and with the message of the modern economics of
information. Credit constraints have been shown to explain fluctuations in
investment in small and medium-sized enterprises; and these fluctuations in
turn play a role in economic downturns. Stiglitz (1998) has shown how
imperfections in equity “markets which limit the ability of firms to spread
their risks, and more generally information imperfections lead to “risk-averse”
behaviour on the part of firms.” The risk averse behaviours cited by Stiglitz
(1994, 1998) are the pro-cyclical nature of inventories, which in perfectly
competitive models act as stabilisers, and the cyclical pattern of hours and
employment, but we would add the adoption of high performance work and
human resource practices to this list as well.
In summary, the above stylised model rests on three basic assumptions
which are compatible with both the IR conception of equity-efficiency and the
modern theories of growth and inequality.
1. The first assumption is that the high-road approach requires some up
front set-up cost even though the project's payoff is obtained in the
future. This is consistent with the long-run complimentarity of equity
and efficiency emphasised by employment relations (Meltz, 1989).
Indeed, in the short run, because of the ease of cost cutting or pursuing
little or no training the low-road approach can clearly exhibit a trade-
off between efficiency and equity.
2. The second assumption is that markets are imperfect (especially
those of capital). This implies that workers or firms without enough
funds to cover the set up costs of the high road approach cannot
undertake the desired project because of financial constraints.
Consequently, the assumption that markets operate far from the
perfectly competitive ideal and that actors wishing to act in the most
efficient manner but are prohibited by X-inefficiencies, is compatible
with the ER approach.30
3. Finally, even if credit markets were perfect, the absence of proper
“insurance markets” in which individuals and firms can divest
themselves of risk would mean that even if individuals could borrow
for their education and training and firms could borrow in order to pay
for the cost of progressive HR innovations, the returns on these
investments would still be risky even though the expected return is
high. Thus poorer individuals and smaller firms are less willing to bear
these risks and hence will keep pursuing the low road.
5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This paper had three main objectives. First it surveyed modern theoretical and
empirical evidence on the relation between income distribution and economic
growth and found it to be in accordance with the tenets of equity-efficiency
theory in IR. Next the paper sought to integrate the common assumptions
underlying both equity-efficiency theory in industrial relations and modern
endogenous economic growth models. It was suggested that both are
premised on a similar model of the economy; that of imperfectly competitive
market structures. Both approaches also acknowledged the critical importance
of fairness and co-operation in the employment relationship (more so in the
IR framework) as a remedy for the potentially destabilising effects of
excessive inequality on an economy. The paper then presented a model of
how the long run complimentarity of equity and efficiency can be thwarted by
either employer preferences for short term gains, or by capital market
constraints which prevent organisations from pursuing high road practices or
engaging in high human capital investment in their workers. The paper finally
demonstrated how the persistence of inequality is only sustainable so long as
social mobility is not comprised or, more importantly, so long as the
perceived fairness of the economic system is not compromised because this is
the only way to sustain long-term inequalities without having to deal with
socio-economic instability. Models of political disruption from the
endogenous growth literature do not address this issue fully (they assume that
inequality has a positive effect on unrest) whereas equity as defined by
Industrial Relationists is contingent on remuneration but also on the
procedures by which that distribution has emerged.
In terms of policy conclusions, the first step in removing capital market
constraints is a recognition by monetary and banking authorities,
governments, and human resources departments, that such constraints exist.
The next step is an agreement among the parties to remove the constraints.
These are difficult, but not insurmountable barriers. What may be most
difficult is to change the preferences of many small and medium sized
employers for the low road. It may not be that these employers deliberately31
want to disadvantage their employees. Competition, business pressures, lack
of sufficient time, lack of an understanding of constructive human resource
practices, all work against a more enlightened long-term approach to
developing employees to their fullest potential in accordance with high
performance human resources practices. At the same time surveys have
shown that employees are very anxious to upgrade their skills and do invest
sizeable amounts of time and resources.
The key to change then is the employer, but should the pursuit of the
high road be left to individual employer initiative or should the state provide a
carrot and/or a stick approach? Countries and analysts are divided on which
approach to pursue. Some countries such as the United Kingdom and
Singapore have introduced compulsory training taxes. The UK subsequently
abandoned this approach after negative reviews of the scheme. Canada,
Sweden and others have provided government financial assistance for
training. Again there have been mixed reviews about the success of these
programs.
We believe that a balanced approach to economic growth and income
distribution is the most desirable path for economies to follow. For industrial
relationists this path leads employers and employees beyond the zero sum
illusion. How to get on, and stay on, this new path requires further analysis.
Rafael Gomez London School of Economics
Noah Meltz Netanya Academic College/ University of Toronto32
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